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INTRODUCTION 
Envision a plaintiff who was injured on the job at a construction 
site due to his employer’s negligence. The plaintiff has chronic back 
pain, but it is not verifiable on an X-ray, nor is a physical injury readily 
discernible by any other technology. Presently, fact finders are given the 
broad discretion to decide whether they find this plaintiff credible, and 
accordingly, whether they believe he is truly in pain and deserves dam-
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ages for pain and suffering. However, neuroimaging—specifically func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)1—could allow those fact 
finders to visualize whether this plaintiff was hurting by depicting the 
unique signatures that are activated in the brain when the plaintiff expe-
riences pain. Accordingly, the use of fMRI imaging would potentially 
provide a more objective basis through which fact finders could decide 
whether this plaintiff was legitimately suffering from chronic pain. 
The price paid for pain and suffering in litigation is extraordinarily 
high. Damage awards for injuries stemming from pain and suffering in 
tort amount to billions of dollars per year.2 Disability benefits alone, 
which are often awarded to those who suffer—or claim to suffer—
chronic pain, constitute over $100 billion annually.3 
Nonpecuniary damages have historically been difficult to calculate. 
In contrast to pecuniary damages, pain and suffering, emotional harms, 
and damages stemming from “invisible injuries” often have no ceiling or 
floor, and jury awards can range from massive sums to no award at all, 
presumably based on the jury’s partiality and trust toward a particular 
plaintiff.4 Because of the difficulty in affixing a monetary value to these 
nonmonetary injuries, legislators and legal theorists over the years have 
attempted to develop a more concrete method of calculating these dam-
ages. 
State legislatures have experimented with statutes that limit non-
pecuniary damage awards for particular causes of action with varying 
success. Some states have statutes in place that cap nonpecuniary dam-
ages at a predefined value,5 while other states’ statutes use a combination 
of a hard cap and formulas that take variables into account such as life 
                                                     
 1. See infra Part I.B for a description of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and 
other neuroimaging technologies. 
 2. Amanda Pustilnik, Exploring the Brain in Pain: An Applied Neuroscience & Law Initiative, 
MASS. GEN. HOSP. CTR. FOR L. BRAIN & BEHAV. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/ 
pustilnik-blog-1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See, e.g., Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process Constraints on Noneconomic 
Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 258–59 (2003) (arguing in part that fact 
finders are given little guidance in assessing noneconomic compensatory damages and that “[t]he 
fundamental problem at [the damage assessment] point in the process is that the jury has essentially 
been asked to conjure a damages figure from thin air”). 
 5. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 893.55, 895.04 (2014) (limiting award of noneconomic damages in 
medical liability cases to $750,000, indexed for inflation); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 
(2015) (limiting award of noneconomic damages in medical liability cases to $250,000, and limiting 
total award of damages to $1,000,000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-19a02, 60-1903 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Regular Sess.) (limiting noneconomic damages to $250,000 for causes of action accru-
ing between July 1, 1988 and July 1, 2014; $300,000 for causes of action accruing between July 1, 
2014 and July 1, 2018; $325,000 for causes of action accruing between July 1, 2018 and July 1, 
2022; and $350,000 for causes of action accruing on or after July 1, 2022). 
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expectancy and earnings.6 State courts have differed in their views as to 
the constitutionality of damage-capping statutes. These statutes have 
been challenged and upheld by some state courts,7 while others have 
struck them down on constitutional grounds.8 Presently, there are as 
many damage award structures as there are states, and it is clear that the 
noneconomic damages system is in flux nationally. Unsurprisingly, legal 
scholars have suggested a range of alternative damage award structures 
on which states could base their statutory schemes. 
Some legal scholars have proposed replacing the current pain and 
suffering award system—a system that relies on broad jury discretion 
and damage caps—with a “system of quantitative ‘scheduling’ of awards 
for nonpecuniary loss.”9 Three alternative scheduling models have been 
suggested.10 The first alternative is “a system of standardized awards set 
according to a matrix of dollar values based on victim age and injury se-
verity.”11 The second is “a scenario-based system that employs descrip-
tions of prototypical injuries with corresponding award values designed 
to be given to juries as guides to valuation.”12 The final alternative is “a 
system of flexible ranges of award floors and caps that reflect the various 
categories of injury severity.”13 Because these schedules can more com-
prehensively address the variability and predictability of problems in 
damage awards, the proponents of these alternatives propose that a sys-
                                                     
 6. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (2014) (limiting noneconomic damages for personal 
injury or wrongful death actions to “$400,000 or the injured person’s life expectancy in years multi-
plied by $8,000, whichever is greater[,]” subject to certain exceptions). 
 7. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1121 (Kan. 2012) (upholding Kansas statute 
capping noneconomic damages under a rational basis review, finding it “‘reasonably conceivable’ 
under the rational basis standard that imposing a limit on noneconomic damages furthers the objec-
tive of reducing and stabilizing insurance premiums by providing predictability and eliminating the 
possibility of large noneconomic damages awards”). 
 8. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 170 (Ala. 1991) (invalidating 
statute requiring $400,000 noneconomic damages cap on grounds that the statute “violates the prin-
ciple of equal protection as guaranteed by §§ 1, 6, and 22 of the Constitution of Alabama”); State ex 
rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1095 (Ohio 1999) (holding 
statute that capped noneconomic damage awards in personal injury cases to $200,000 “invalid 
on due process grounds because it is unreasonable and arbitrary, irrespective of whether it 
bears a real and substantial relation to public health or welfare”); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 
771 P.2d 711, 728, amended by 780 P.2d 260 (Wash. 1989) (invalidating Washington state 
statute that limited the award of noneconomic damages for bodily injury to 43% of the average 
annual wage multiplied by the plaintiff’s life expectancy on the grounds that the variable limit 
on noneconomic damages awards violated the right to a trial by jury provided for by the Wash-
ington State Constitution). 
 9. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: 
Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 975 (1989). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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tem of matrices or scenarios is superior to the floors and caps system.14 
Again, a floors and caps system enables broad jury discretion, which 
might be avoided through matrices or scenarios. 
Unfortunately, despite the fact that these alternatives are generally 
well-accepted in the legal community, the system for awarding pain and 
suffering damages has remained in a stagnant state—a system that relies 
on the broad discretion of the jury. Thus, with nonpecuniary damages 
award systems in a state of flux, it is reasonable to begin searching for 
alternative models which might provide a more objective system of 
measuring noneconomic injuries. 
This Note discusses the pros, cons, and feasibility of a pain and suf-
fering award system that incorporates neuroimaging evidence, where a 
floors and caps system would be largely unnecessary and plaintiffs 
would be able to collect the awards they deserve while still operating 
within a system based on narrowed jury discretion. This Note argues 
that, while holding promise for the near future, the current pain neuroim-
aging technology is not sufficiently reliable nor accepted in the scientific 
community to warrant widespread use in litigation to prove pain and suf-
fering injuries, and at present, courts are likely to exclude pain scans be-
cause of their prejudicial nature. 
First, Part I provides a brief background of current structural and 
functional neuroimaging technology and whether the technology can be 
used to prove pain and suffering. Next, Part II discusses the evidentiary 
hurdles for getting neuroimages admitted as evidence as seen in a wide 
variety of cases where courts have admitted or denied neuroimaging evi-
dence. Part III analyzes the potential uses of neuroimaging evidence in 
proving pain and suffering and the implicit problems with its admission 
into the courtroom. Finally, this Note ultimately concludes that because 
the technology is not presently generally accepted in the scientific com-
munity as a verifiable method to prove pain, the judicial system is not 
currently prepared for the broad-scale admission of neuroimaging evi-
dence to prove pain and suffering. 
I. BACKGROUND: AVAILABLE NEUROIMAGING TECHNOLOGY 
Neuroimages are generated by computers, are produced from non-
invasive techniques, and represent both the brain’s structure and func-
tion.15 The technology is relatively new.16 In order to understand why 
                                                     
 14. Id. 
 15. See Elizabeth Haberfeld et al., Neuroimaging: Visualizing Brain Structure and Function, 
CTR. FOR BIOETHICS AT COLUMBIA UNIV., http://ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/neuroethics/module1/ 
foundationtext/index.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016). 
 16. See id. 
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neuroimages should not be admitted as evidence to prove pain and suf-
fering at this stage, it is imperative to have a basic understanding of the 
technology itself. This Part first provides background information on 
structural and functional neuroimaging techniques. It then discusses the 
structural regions of the brain believed to be implicated in pain percep-
tion and explains how the current technology may be used to prove pain 
and suffering. 
A. Structural Neuroimaging Technology 
Two techniques are primarily used to generate structural neu-
roimages (images of the brain’s structure): computerized tomography 
(CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).17 MRIs are expensive and 
produce a high-quality image, while CT scans are less expensive but of 
lower quality.18 Additionally, MRIs take longer to capture and produce 
an image.19 
CT scans “measure the attenuation of X-ray beams passing through 
target tissue,” or in other words, the scans produce black and white im-
ages that show the degree that different types of brain tissue absorb and 
deflect X-ray beams, which provides a structural image.20 A subtype of 
CT that is useful for showing how blood flows to particular regions of 
the brain is the single positron emission CT (SPECT).21 A SPECT scan 
integrates CT and also incorporates a radioactive tracer to view the brain 
and body; the tracer allows clinicians to see how blood flows to tissues 
and organs.22 CT scans are widely used in medicine and produce an accu-
rate image of a particular patient’s brain structure.23 
In MRI, “grayscale images are constructed from the electromagnet-
ic signals that are emitted by the proton nuclei of hydrogen atoms, which 
are found predominantly in tissue water.”24 In order to obtain MRI imag-
es, a person is placed in an MRI scanner, which has a strong external 
magnetic field, and the nuclei in the patient’s brain tissue are pulsed with 
radio frequency waves, producing a structural image.25 Like CT scans, 
                                                     
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Jeffery A. Coffman, Computed Tomography in Psychiatry, in BRAIN IMAGING: APPLI-
CATIONS IN PSYCHIATRY 1, 5 (Nancy C. Andreasen ed., 1989). 
 21. SPECT (Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography) Scan, MAYFIELD BRAIN & 
SPINE, http://www.mayfieldclinic.com/PE-SPECT.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2016). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Coffman, supra note 20, at 1. 
 24. Jennifer Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball?, 
49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (1997). 
 25. Id. 
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MRI is a reliable and common method of producing structural images of 
the brain.26 
Though MRI is the more expensive of the structural neuroimaging 
techniques, it does offer advantages over CT.27 The first advantage is 
that, unlike CT, in which multiple images should not be taken sequential-
ly due to the risk of radiation exposure, MRI allows multiple scans to 
gather images in rapid sequence with no risk of radiation over-
exposure.28 The second advantage is that MRI has vastly superior ana-
tomical resolution for soft tissue structures, which is highly desirable in 
all settings.29 Both of these technologies have traditionally been used to 
show and prove physical injuries to the brain. 
B. Functional Neuroimaging Technology 
In contrast to the structural neuroimaging techniques described in 
the previous subsection, functional neuroimages actually capture images 
of the brain while in action.30 The two most prevalent functional neu-
roimaging techniques are positron emission tomography (PET) and func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).31 
PET scans detect the spatial distribution of water molecules or glu-
cose molecules within the brain, which are labeled with positron-emitting 
radioisotopes.32 The radioisotope data from the PET scanner is then 
computer-analyzed in order to determine the relative differences in met-
abolic rates across the structures of the brain.33 The resulting computer-
generated image depicts metabolic rates through color gradations.34 From 
these images, scientists can infer that the brain structures that have the 
highest metabolic rates are those that are most involved and active in 
responding to different stimuli—for example, pain.35 
Conversely, fMRIs measure blood oxygenation levels within the 
brain in order to determine which brain structures are being utilized 
                                                     
 26. Id. 
 27. Nancy C. Andreasen, Introduction to BRAIN IMAGING: APPLICATIONS IN PSYCHIATRY, 
supra note 20, at ix, x. 
 28. Nancy C. Andreasen, Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Imaging, in BRAIN IMAGING: 
APPLICATIONS IN PSYCHIATRY, supra note 20, at 67, 68. 
 29. Id. at 68. 
 30. Henry H. Holcomb et al., Positron Emission Tomography: Measuring the Metabolic and 
Neurochemical Characteristics of the Living Human Nervous System, in BRAIN IMAGING: 
APPLICATIONS IN PSYCHIATRY, supra note 20, at 235, 236–37. 
 31. See generally Andreasen, supra note 27. 
 32. Holcomb, supra note 30, at 238. 
 33. Id. at 236–37. 
 34. See id. at 240–41. 
 35. See id. at 237. 
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when a subject performs a cognitive activity.36 This technique measures 
the change in the blood oxygenation level using a method called blood-
oxygenation-level dependent contrast imaging, which is an index of met-
abolic activity and superimposes data onto a static, structural MRI image 
of the brain.37 This process produces neuroimages with high resolution 
and dynamic information about brain activity.38 
Similarly to a PET scan, fMRI allows scientists to make inferences 
based on the relationship between changes in brain structures and the 
subject’s mental activity.39 Both of these technologies have widespread 
clinical application. For example, researchers have used PET and fMRI 
to pinpoint regions of the brain associated with the human perception of 
pain,40 which is essential if these technologies are to be admitted as evi-
dence of a litigant’s pain and suffering, or lack thereof. 
C. Locating Structural Regions of the Brain Implicated in Pain  
Perception with Presently Available Technology 
These new neuroimaging techniques have allowed researchers to 
discover structures of the brain that are responsible for pain perception 
with rapidly increasing accuracy and understanding.41 The idea of pain 
signals being conducted by a distinct class of neurons, or brain cells, was 
first described in 1906.42 Since then, PET and fMRI have allowed re-
searchers to hone in on specific areas of the brain that they believe are 
responsible for the human experience of pain.43 Early studies of the brain 
regions responsible for the pain experience were performed using PET 
and quickly furthered our understanding of the brain’s role in the pain 
sensation.44 
PET studies have shown that large distributed brain networks were 
activated during painful stimulation.45 Research indicates that the cortical 
and subcortical regions—the brain regions consisting of the cortex and 
regions below the cortex—that activate during pain stimulation include 
the anterior cingulate cortex, insula, frontal cortices, primary somatosen-
                                                     
 36. Kulynych, supra note 24, at 1256. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Jonathan Brooks & Irene Tracey, From Nociception to Pain Perception: Imaging the Spi-
nal and Supraspinal Pathways, 207 J. ANATOMY 19, 19 (2005). 
 41. See id. 
 42. See generally CHARLES S. SHERRINGTON, THE INTEGRATIVE ACTION OF THE NERVOUS 
SYSTEM (Oxford Univ. Press 1906). 
 43. See Brooks & Tracey, supra note 40, at 20. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 22. 
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sory cortex, second somatosensory cortex, and amygdala.46 This amal-
gam of brain structures has since been dubbed the “pain matrix.”47 
The pain matrix is divided into medial and lateral pain systems.48 
Although this is a simplified distinction of the involved neural networks, 
it is a useful categorization because brain regions that appear to have 
similar roles in pain perception are grouped together.49 The lateral pain 
system, which consists of the primary and secondary somatosensory cor-
tex (regions that are responsible for handling most sensory perceptions), 
is thought to be primarily responsible for discerning the location and in-
tensity of painful stimuli.50 Conversely, the anterior cingulate cortex is 
believed to be involved in the cognitive-evaluative component—the ex-
periential and analytical aspect of pain.51 Additionally, the insula is be-
lieved to encode both the intensity and the laterality (whether pain is on 
the left or right side of the body) of both painful and nonpainful thermal 
stimuli, as well as potentially having a role in affective pain processing, 
which is the emotional response to pain.52 Accordingly, it is likely that 
the insula is responsible for integrating information from both the medial 
and lateral systems.53 Through pinpointing specific brain regions respon-
sible for different aspects of the experience of pain, this data will allow 
for litigants to prove what they are experiencing with more precision. 
Using electroencephalography, which is not a neuroimaging tech-
nique but rather a method of measuring electrical activity in the brain, 
our current understanding of the pain matrix and its processing of pain 
has further improved.54 It is now believed that the frontal operculum, 
which includes the secondary somatosensory cortex and insula, are very 
strongly implicated in pain sensation.55 For example, these regions of the 
brain are the only cortical regions found to produce a perception of pain 
in response to direct electrical stimulation.56 The above group of brain 
structures is not an exhaustive list of structures involved in pain percep-
tion, but illustrates that at this point, researchers have been able to locate 
specific regions of the brain that allow humans to experience pain. 
                                                     
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. M. C. Bushnell et al., Pain Perception: Is There a Role for Primary Somatosensory Cor-
tex?, 96 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7705, 7705 (1999). 
 51. Pierre Rainville et al., Pain Affect Encoded in Human Anterior Cingulate but Not Soma-
tosensory Cortex, 277 SCIENCE 968, 968 (1997). 
 52. Brooks & Tracey, supra note 40, at 23. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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Although it is clear that the current technology has allowed re-
searchers to discover structures of the brain that are responsible for pain 
perception, whether this is enough to prove pain and suffering in court is 
more tenuous. 
D. Using Neuroimaging Technology to Prove Pain and Suffering 
Experts’ opinions on whether neuroimaging technology is reliable 
and accurate enough for courtroom use are conflicting, but the reliability 
of the technology has increased markedly in a very short period of time.57 
For example, a neurologist and director of Stanford University’s Pain 
Management Center testified as an expert in a workers’ compensation 
case wherein an employee suffered chemical burns that he alleged left 
him with chronic pain. The neurologist stated that he was “of the strong 
opinion that in 2008, we cannot use fMRI to detect pain, and we should 
not be using it in a legal setting.”58 Although the employee’s lawyers 
assembled evidence that included an fMRI scan showing increased activ-
ity in the pain matrix of the brain, this neurologist, in testifying for the 
defense, did not feel the technology and its use in assessing and showing 
pain were reliable enough at that time.59 
More recently, however, a greater body of research has developed 
using fMRI to show pain.60 In 2013, for example, in four studies involv-
ing 114 participants, researchers developed an fMRI-based measure that 
predicts pain intensity individualized to the particular participant (a “neu-
rologic signature”).61 The results of their studies showed significant 
promise for the use of fMRI in measuring pain.62 In two of the studies, 
researchers found that the neurologic signature correlated pain sensitivity 
and brain structures with the subjects’ ability to discriminate painful heat 
from a simple sensation of warmth, and the subjects’ ability to anticipate 
pain and recall pain.63 In the third study, the neurologic signature dis-
criminated between physical pain and social pain, and in the last study, 
the strength of the neurologic signature was “substantially reduced” 
when an analgesic was administered.64 These results strongly indicate 
                                                     
 57. See generally id. 
 58. Greg Miller, Brain Scans of Pain Raise Questions for the Law, 323 SCIENCE 195, 195 
(2009), available at http://apkarianlab.northwestern.edu/media/ScncePainConf.pdf (quoting neurol-
ogist Sean Mackey). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Tor D. Wager et al., An fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain, 368 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1388, 1388 (2013), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa1204471. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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that it is possible to use fMRI to assess pain in healthy persons.65 The 
problem is that many external factors affect an individual’s pain percep-
tion, and less is known about the individual’s neurologic signature in 
response to chronic pain, which is often the injury claimed for pain and 
suffering damages. 
Preliminarily, sensitivity to pain varies significantly from one indi-
vidual to another.66 Additionally, psychological factors including anxie-
ty, attention, and distractions likely alter neurologic signatures in fMRI 
scans.67 Anxiety and focusing on pain often increase pain; consequently, 
they will strengthen the pain’s neurologic signature in fMRI scans.68 In 
contrast, distraction from pain will often decrease the neurologic signa-
ture.69 Further, imagined pain often activates the same regions of the pain 
matrix as real pain.70 This creates substantial problems when claiming 
damages because plaintiffs with frivolous lawsuits who exaggerate their 
pain could potentially exploit fMRI evidence to further their claims. 
In contrast, based on current studies, other neuroscientists believe 
that the time for fMRI pain evidence is nigh. One study found that activi-
ty in the medial prefrontal cortex and right insula correlated strongly 
with the duration and intensity of chronic pain in individuals with chron-
ic back pain.71 This sect of neuroscientists is optimistic that the fMRI 
technique provides an “objective measure of pain in these patients.”72 
Legal commentators following the development of the science believe 
the legal sector may utilize the science even before the scientific com-
munity at large is satisfied with the technique. One law professor noted 
that fMRI-pain researchers “care more about causation than we do in the 
law,” and that “[i]f the correlation is high enough . . . we [in the law] 
would see that as a useful tool.”73 Thus, even if researchers do not find 
the near perfect correlation between pain stimuli and neurologic signa-
ture they strive for in their research, the technology might still enter the 
courtroom because of trial judges’ discretion in the admission of scien-
tific and expert evidence. 
Because there are two schools of thought regarding the reliability of 
fMRI and neuroimaging technology in accurately showing real pain, 
whether neuroimaging evidence will be admitted will likely come down 
                                                     
 65. See id. 
 66. Miller, supra note 58, at 195. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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to the credibility of the expert testifying on either side. Accordingly, at-
tempting to have neuroimaging pain evidence admitted in litigation is not 
an easy task at this point due to evidentiary standards. 
II. EVIDENTIARY HURDLES IN ADMITTING NEUROIMAGING EVIDENCE 
Although neuroimaging techniques have allowed us to somewhat 
reliably visualize the sensation of pain, lawyers have encountered diffi-
culty in getting neuroimages and expert testimony regarding neuroimag-
es admitted into evidence. This Part provides an overview of the Frye 
and Daubert standards for the admission of scientific evidence and ex-
amines whether neuroimages might be admitted under these standards by 
analyzing cases where it has been attempted. Finally, this Part concludes 
by explaining why Daubert jurisdictions are likely to be more amenable 
to the admission of neuroimaging evidence. 
The majority rule for admissibility of scientific evidence prior to 
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) was the “general 
acceptance” standard.74 This standard, known as the “Frye standard,” 
requires any scientific evidence to be generally accepted in the scientific 
community in order to be admitted into evidence.75 In Frye, the court 
faced the decision of whether to admit the systolic blood pressure decep-
tion test; this test is based on the theory that truth is spontaneous and 
comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood re-
quires a conscious effort that is resultantly reflected in an individual’s 
blood pressure.76 The court held that this test did not have the requisite 
recognition and general acceptance among psychological and physiolog-
ical authorities necessary to justify admitting expert testimony on the 
defendant’s behalf.77 Although the Frye standard is still used in some 
states, the United States Supreme Court determined in Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. that FRE 702 superseded Frye for claims 
arising in federal courts.78 
The Court in Daubert looked to United States v. Abel in determin-
ing whether common law evidence standards could still be relevant in the 
new world of the Federal Rules of Evidence.79 Taking particular note of 
                                                     
 74. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 75. Id. at 1014. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993). 
 79. Id. at 588–89; see United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51–52 (1984) (“In principle, under 
the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains. ‘All relevant evidence is admissible, except 
as otherwise provided . . . .’ In reality, of course, the body of common law knowledge continues to 
exist, though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated pow-
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FRE 402, which states in pertinent part, “[a]ll relevant evidence is ad-
missible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by 
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,” the Court was faced 
with a difficult decision due to the potential relevancy of scientific evi-
dence inherent in many criminal and civil trials.80 The Court held that 
FRE 702 speaks to the common law standard set forth in Frye.81 
FRE 702, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, pro-
vides: If “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in is-
sue,” then “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify [thereto] in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise.”82 Per Daubert, because FRE 702’s text does not 
establish general acceptance as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility, 
nor does anything in the Federal Rules of Evidence indicate that the 
Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a general acceptance 
standard, the general acceptance standard should not be applied in feder-
al trials.83 
As a result, the Court held that general acceptance is not a precondi-
tion to the admissibility of scientific evidence.84 The Court further held 
that “the Rules of Evidence—especially Rule 702—[assigned] to the trial 
judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reli-
able foundation and is relevant to the task at hand,” and that “[p]ertinent 
evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those de-
mands.”85 Additionally, the Court added several nonexclusive factors to 
determine the reliability of the expert testimony, including whether the 
technique has been tested, whether the technique has been subjected to 
peer review and publication, the potential error rate in using the tech-
nique, the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the tech-
nique’s operation, and whether the technique has been generally accepted 
in the scientific community.86 Thus, the Court concluded that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence superseded Frye.87 The Daubert factor test has since 
                                                                                                                       
ers.”) (quoting Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. 
REV. 908, 915 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588; FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 81. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. 
 82. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 83. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588–89. 
 84. Id. at 597. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 593–94. 
 87. Id. at 597. 
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replaced the Frye general acceptance standard in determining the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence in federal courts.88 
Regardless of whether a court applies the Frye or Daubert standard, 
it is difficult to predict whether a given court will admit neuroimaging 
evidence to prove pain and suffering due to the relative novelty of using 
the technology in this way and the paucity of case law on point. Howev-
er, courts’ responses to neuroimaging evidence to prove different inju-
ries, as well as decisions regarding its admissibility in lie detection, may 
prove instructive. 
A. Admissibility Under Frye’s General Acceptance Standard 
Although the Court in Daubert held that FRE 702 superseded the 
Frye standard for federal trials, the general acceptance standard is still 
used in a fairly large number of state courts.89 
For example, a New York state court expressly refused to apply the 
Daubert factor test, even at the request of the defendant, and instead ap-
plied the general acceptance standard to the use of a PET scan expert in a 
personal injury case.90 After the plaintiff had offered an expert’s testimo-
ny in order to support her allegation that she suffered minor brain trauma 
when a piece of her bathroom ceiling collapsed on her head, the defend-
ant filed a motion attempting to exclude the expert’s testimony, asserting 
that the use of PET scans to diagnose brain injury is not generally ac-
cepted in the medical field.91 The trial judge found that the PET scan sat-
isfied the general acceptance standard and denied the defendant’s mo-
tion, allowing the jury to hear the expert’s testimony with regard to the 
PET scan results.92 
Conversely, in State v. Smith, a Maryland trial judge refused to al-
low fMRI evidence in a criminal case under the Frye standard.93 The 
judge in this case was faced with the decision of whether to admit fMRI 
scans as evidence that the defendant was telling the truth—a modern 
neurological polygraph test.94 Here, the defendant submitted testimony 
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and research articles in support of his request to admit the results of the 
fMRI that was conducted on him.95 The defendant argued that “the fMRI 
methodology used for lie detection and truth verification is generally ac-
cepted in its relevant scientific community, as shown through the ‘totali-
ty of published scientific literature on the topic.’”96 Although the defend-
ant presented twenty-five peer-reviewed scientific journal articles on the 
fMRI lie detection and truth verification method, the court was “not 
swayed by that number when considering the depth of scientific analysis 
done in a particular area[,]”97 implying that because other areas of sci-
ence have a greater body of research, twenty-five articles was insuffi-
cient. Further, though none of the submitted articles concluded that the 
technology does not work, the court was “not persuaded that the fact that 
there is no evidence a scientific method does ‘not work’ is evidence that 
it is reliable and valid.”98 Importantly, and instructive for future litigants, 
the court noted that “the standard required for admissibility in a court of 
law is higher than the method simply not working.”99 The court further 
noted that “[t]here must be evidence of the method’s reliability and va-
lidity as determined by its general acceptance in the relevant scientific 
community,” and that the “tepid approval of a few scholars through 
twenty-five journal articles does not persuade this Court that such ac-
ceptance exists.”100 
Thus, as these cases illustrate, although the Frye standard requires 
general acceptance in the scientific community, the admissibility of evi-
dence still largely comes down to the broad discretion of the judge as to 
what exactly constitutes general acceptance. Smith in particular illus-
trates the resistance to admitting unfamiliar scientific evidence such as 
fMRI into the courtroom. Although every journal article brought to the 
court indicated that the method was reliable, the court still refused to 
admit the evidence because the judge simply did not feel that twenty-five 
scholarly articles was sufficient.101 
What, then is needed in order to achieve general acceptance? The 
answer is impossible to predict because it depends on the fortification of 
each judge’s scientific evidence gate. FMRI evidence of pain and suffer-
ing is unlikely to fare any differently. Indeed, the problem with the Frye 
standard is that it “exclude[s] cutting-edge scientific evidence that might 
be [1] both relevant and reliable under traditional legal standards but 
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[2] [i]s not yet widely accepted by scientists.”102 The Daubert standard, 
however, may prove friendlier to this type of evidence due to its distanc-
ing from the general acceptance standard. 
B. Admissibility Under the Daubert Standard and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence 
Under the Daubert standard, neuroimaging evidence has been simi-
larly met with skepticism. In United States v. Semrau, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals was faced with the decision of whether to affirm or 
reverse a trial court evidentiary decision similar to that of the Maryland 
trial judge in Smith.103 As in Smith, the lower court in Semrau refused to 
admit expert testimony regarding fMRI truth verification testing in its 
Daubert hearing.104 The Semrau court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion 
of this evidence in affirming the defendant’s conviction for healthcare 
fraud.105 The court reasoned in part that, pursuant to FRE 403,106 the 
fMRI evidence’s probative value was substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial nature.107 In a footnote, the court stated, “[t]he prospect of 
introducing fMRI lie detection results into criminal trials is undoubtedly 
intriguing and, perhaps, a little scary.”108 Again, this illustrates courts’ 
reluctance to accept newfangled neuroimaging evidence. Because the 
Daubert admissibility formulation is dependent on an individual judge’s 
discretion, it is difficult to predict whether a particular court applying the 
Daubert standard will allow evidence of this type into its courtroom. 
In contrast to Semrau, in In re Welding Fume Products Liability 
Litigation, the Federal Northern District of Ohio in its Daubert hearing 
admitted several of the defendant’s neuroscientific experts’ testimonies 
to rebut the plaintiff’s claim that their manganese fumes caused neuro-
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logical injuries.109 The defendant’s evidence, which included MRI and 
PET scans, allegedly established that there was no causal link between 
manganese and the claimed neurological injuries.110 In reliance on their 
evidence, the defendant filed a motion to exclude all testimony that re-
futed their experts’ interpretations of the neurological scans.111 The court 
denied the motion, reasoning that although the defendant’s evidence was 
convincing, it could not prove dispositively the causation or lack there-
of.112 
Because admissibility is left solely to the discretion of the judge—
the “gatekeeper” of evidence—it is less relevant whether the submitted 
methodology is generally accepted in the community and more relevant 
that the methodology proves accurate. Thus, it seems that neuroimaging 
evidence may more easily enter the courtroom under the Daubert stand-
ard. 
III. POTENTIAL FUTURE USE 
Because most of the cases in which courts admit neuroimaging evi-
dence are unreported, the gap in the legal community’s knowledge of 
how to use this evidence, and whether they even can use this evidence, is 
growing instead of shrinking. This Part first examines two cases in which 
neuroimaging evidence was admitted, and then moves on to describe the 
uses and problems with the use of neuroimaging evidence in civil litiga-
tion. 
A. Two Promising Cases Using SPECT and fMRI 
Although there is a notable gap in reported cases, one of the first 
reported cases in which neuroimaging evidence was admitted was a 
Ninth Circuit case, Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Retire-
ment Plan.113 This case illustrates the problems that plaintiffs face in at-
tempting to gain disability benefits for nontraditional physical injuries, 
and the potential assistance that neuroimaging evidence can provide. In 
Boyd, many of the plaintiff’s symptoms, such as headaches and fatigue, 
were not physically manifested.114 
This rather well-known case centered on one of the first suits 
brought against the National Football Association for degenerative disa-
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bility benefits under the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle National Football League 
Player Retirement Plan (the Plan).115 The Plan provides disability, re-
tirement, and other benefits to eligible current and former National Foot-
ball League (NFL) players.116 The plaintiff, Brent Boyd, was an offen-
sive lineman for the Minnesota Vikings from 1980 to 1987.117 In 2000, 
Boyd filed his second application for football degenerative disability 
benefits under the Plan, claiming benefits based on alleged organic brain 
problems resulting from head trauma.118 His symptoms included “a gen-
eral constant flu-like feeling, fatigue, headaches, queasiness, forgetful-
ness, intermittent blurred vision, difficulty reading, lack of concentration, 
learning difficulty, memory loss, dizziness and light-headedness.”119 The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the NFL on the 
grounds that the plaintiff could not prove his alleged brain injuries.120 
The physician for the Plan concluded from his examination that the 
plaintiff “[did] appear to have several problems that may arise out of 
head injuries suffered in the course of his NFL career.”121 At Boyd’s re-
quest, a second physician conducted a SPECT scan122 on Boyd, and the 
scan revealed decreased brain activity consistent with head trauma.123 
This evidence was admitted into court under the federal Daubert stand-
ard, as interpreted by an expert.124 The results of the SPECT were re-
ferred to another physician whose medical conclusions were admitted 
into court.125 Unfortunately for Boyd, this physician concluded that 
“[b]ased on the evidence available, the alleged head injury of August, 
1980 could not be organically responsible for all or even a major portion 
of the neurologic and/or neuropsychologic problems that Mr. Boyd is 
experiencing now, to a reasonable degree of medical probability[,]” and 
this “include[d] the allegedly abnormal SPECT scan results in this cate-
gory.”126 
Although in Boyd’s case the neuroscientific evidence worked 
against him, in future cases this type of evidence may help plaintiffs with 
similar injuries, and in all likelihood, will even be used by current and 
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former NFL players to collect football degenerative benefits for brain 
injuries sustained during their time in the league. 
In contrast, the plaintiff in Koch v. Western Emulsions Inc. was able 
to benefit from the admission of fMRI evidence to prove his pain.127 Carl 
Koch sued his former employer, Western Emulsions, for damages arising 
out of a 2005 work incident which resulted in Koch burning his wrist 
with molten asphalt.128 When the suit was filed in 2006, Koch still alleg-
edly had chronic pain in his wrist.129 In order to prove the pain, he had an 
fMRI performed on him at the fMRI Research Center at Columbia Uni-
versity.130 The neuroscientist at the Research Center believed she had 
developed a method that would allow her to visualize chronic pain via 
fMRI.131 When she lightly touched Koch’s injured wrist, the stimulus 
provoked a signal in the pain matrix, while lightly touching the other un-
affected wrist did not.132 The neuroscientist performing the test stated 
that this methodology “is a well-characterized way to distinguish allo-
dynia—a pain response to a stimulus that does not normally cause pain—
from imagined pain.”133 The case unsurprisingly turned into a battle of 
the experts.134 
At trial, the defendants called a neurologist of their own to the stand 
who testified that pain is too subjective to measure in this way, and that 
the signal seen on the scan could be produced by imagining the pain or 
concentrating on it.135 In the end, the trial judge admitted the scan, which 
contributed to the case settling for $800,000, a sum that, according to 
Koch’s lawyer, was over ten times the defendant’s initial settlement of-
fer.136 Armed with an fMRI scan allegedly corroborating his claims of 
wrist pain, Koch was able to gain a more favorable settlement offer and 
settle before the conclusion of the trial.137 Thus, the trial court judge’s 
discretion in admitting the neuroimaging evidence was instrumental to 
the final disposition of the case. 
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B. Future Uses and Problems with Use in Civil Litigation 
Irrespective of whether a court applies the Frye or Daubert stand-
ard, it is clear that given the current schism in the scientific community 
as to its reliability and accuracy, as well as the corresponding potential 
prejudice that might be wrought upon its admission, courts are presently 
resistant to admitting neuroimaging evidence. However, the persistent 
development of pain-detecting neuroimaging will lead to increasing de-
mand for these scans and an increasing number of litigants moving to 
admit neuroimaging evidence into court. Similarly, the continually ad-
vancing technology and its growing acceptance in the scientific commu-
nity will inevitably increase the courts’ confidence in admitting this evi-
dence. But as the admission of neuroimaging evidence becomes more 
common, new issues will arise. 
Plaintiffs and defendants alike will increasingly gravitate toward 
the use of this evidence, whether the technology is reliable or not. The 
human tendency is to give greater weight to evidence we can see with 
our own eyes. Indeed, for many, seeing is believing. Regardless of 
whether the scans are accurate and reliable, fact finders may tend to 
place trust in the scans simply because they will be impressed by the col-
orful images of the subject’s brain and because the scans intuitively seem 
like objective science. Accordingly, litigants will likely secure neuroim-
aging scans in attempts to support or defend against claims of pain and 
suffering on the chance that the trial judge will admit the scan into evi-
dence. Although in some cases, like Boyd, the evidence may actually 
have a detrimental effect, many will likely move to admit the evidence 
anyway; the battle of the experts always brings with it a gamble. It is 
thus fair to predict that as this technology develops further, litigants’ use 
of favorable pain scans will almost undoubtedly become correspondingly 
common due to the hope that the neuroimaging evidence will sway the 
minds of the fact finders in the litigants’ direction. Regardless of the fre-
quency with which litigants move to admit this evidence, however, 
courts should remain wary to admit it. 
Neuroimaging evidence of pain and suffering—particularly fMRI—
is approaching the level of reliability necessary for use in a courtroom, 
and it may be that it enters the courtroom with relative regularity within 
the next decade. It is clear that researchers have made drastic strides in 
discovering and assessing the brain’s pain matrix.138 As this research be-
comes more accepted, judges using the Frye standard will be more likely 
to admit it under the general acceptance standard. Likewise, courts using 
the Daubert standard will be more apt to accept the evidence with the 
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comfort that the body of research surrounding neuroimaging and pain is 
growing. A scientific method’s general acceptance in the scientific com-
munity seems to bear an inverse relationship to courts’ fear of prejudice 
wrought by the admission of that evidence. Thus, as the body of research 
grows, courts’ acceptance will correspondingly increase. 
At present, however, the scientific community is divided as to the 
validity of pain neuroimaging technology.139 Until the greater scientific 
community supports the methodology and neuroimaging scans can pro-
vide a truly objective framework for limiting the broad discretion of the 
fact finder in awarding pain and suffering damages, courts will be—and 
should be—wary to admit neuroimaging scans. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no simplified or expedited path that will fast track the ad-
mittance of neuroimaging evidence of pain and suffering into the court-
room. FMRI pain scans, though close to general acceptance, still do not 
produce the requisite level of certainty to make them useful in the court-
room. For injuries that lack physical proof, a plaintiff’s word will still 
carry overwhelming weight in fact finders’ determination of pain and 
suffering awards.  
Courts are understandably uncomfortable with accepting unproven 
technology to prove questions of fact. Although the method has devel-
oped and increased in reliability and use in the last two decades, at this 
point it is not an agreed-upon valid method to show pain, and judges 
have little precedent to rely on in admitting the scans as evidence. It will 
take bold judges like the judge in Koch to allow this evidence to bolster 
claims of pain and suffering. But as the technology becomes more relia-
ble and generally accepted, the question we must all ask ourselves is 
whether we want a human fact finder or a machine deciding whether we 
are in pain. 
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